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Introduction 1
The introduction of direct infl ation targeting in a number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has made it necessary to rely more heavily on the interest rate and the credit channel, while diminishing the prominent role of the exchange rate in the monetary transmission mechanism.
It is essential for central banks to have a genuine and precise understanding of how fast and to what extent a change in their interest instrument modifi es infl ation. In particular, it is crucial to assess whether or not the pass-through from monetary policy rates to long-term market and retail rates is complete, as this is the fi rst building block for the monetary transmission mechanism. If the interest rate pass-through is not complete, the impact of monetary policy actions through the credit, interest rate or exchange rate channels will be considerably attenuated. Against this backdrop, a large amount of research has been dedicated to the interest rate pass-through in industrialized countries: it is generally found to be incomplete and to react sluggishly to changes in the policy rate. 2 More recently, researchers have turned their attention to the CEE countries and showed a strengthening of the pass-through over time. 3 In this paper, we contribute to this subject for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia by not only looking at the relationship between monetary policy rate on the one hand, and market and retail rates on the other hand, but also by studying the whole chain of transmission running from the 7 Provided that the volatility of the credit risk premium embedded in loan rates is stable over time. 8 The competition effect is more important for deposit rates than for lending rates, given that the former are less affected by asymmetric information problems (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004a) . 9 The pass-through can also be amplifi ed, i.e. be higher than unity, if banks charge higher interest rates in an attempt to offset the higher risks resulting from asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) rather than reducing the supply of loans (DeBondt, 2005) . An increase in the general interest rate level raises the average burden of interest payments and thus necessitates an upward adjustment of the risk premium for asymmetric information. The same argument applies to small banks: they fi nd it more diffi cult to obtain external fi nancing owing to asymmetric information problems. This is why they have to pay a risk premium on their deposit rates to attract suffi cient amounts of deposits; consequently, they also require a premium on their lending rates (Gambacorta, 2004) .
Focus 1/06 ◊ ceec.oenb.at 91 interest rate pass-through, given that prices may be adjusted more frequently in a double-digit or high infl ation environment. By contrast, higher interest rate volatility (mirroring higher macroeconomic instability and uncertainty) weakens the interest rate pass-through, given that banks wait longer before changing their rates. The pass-through can be not only incomplete in the long run, but also sluggish in the short run. The reasons for this are manifold: First, adjustment or menu costs can cause banks to react sluggishly to changes in the market rates. Second, the maturity mismatch of banks' loan and deposit portfolios infl uences the way in which they adjusts their lending rates. 10 The more long-term loans are covered by long-term deposits, the less pressure banks feel to adjust their lending rates, since their liabilities are less sensitive to market rates (Weth, 2002) . Finally, given the long-term relationships of banks (especially universal banks) with their customers, they may want to smooth interest rate changes.
The assumption of a stable yield curve makes it possible to take a shortcut by looking directly at the relationship between policy rates and retail (deposit and loan) rates. This approach is referred to as the monetary policy approach (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004a) .
Testable Relationships
The alternative transmission routes from policy rates to retail rates and the ensuing empirically testable relationships are shown in chart 1 and table 1 below.
We set out to answer an array of questions relating to the interest rate passthrough on the basis of the testable relationships shown in table 1. First, is the transmission from the monetary policy rate via market rates to retail rates proportionate in the long run? That is, is there a one-to-one reaction of market rates and, consequently, retail rates to changes in key policy rates? Second, is the pass-through different in different segments of the same economy (households vs. nonfi nancial corporate sector or short term vs. long term)? Third, is there evidence of convergence or divergence across countries and over time?
Note that maturity in this context refers to the period of interest rate fi xation (i.e. the interval between the adjustment dates of interest rates of a loan or deposit contract), not to the duration of the loan or deposit contract between initial payment and full repayment.
In particular, how does the pass-through in the CEE-5 compare with that in the euro area? Finally, does the direction of a change in the monetary policy rate (increase or decrease) have an impact on the short-term adjustment?
3 Data Issues Our dataset covers the CEE-5 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and three euro area countries (Austria, Germany and Spain). The monthly data series include short-term market rates, i.e. (annualized) 1-month money market rates (MMR), and 12-month T-bill rates (if not available, 12-month MMR), long-term market rates, i.e. 3-to 5-year government bond yields, as well as economy-wide and sectoral retail rates (households and nonfi nancial corporate sector) of different maturity (overnight rates, shortand long-term rates). For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Austria and Germany, these data are primarily obtained from the national central banks and the ministries of fi nance. For Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, the main data source is NewCronos (Eurostat). Some of the market rates are drawn from Datastream and Bloomberg, if they were not available from national sources or from Eurostat. Whenever possible, the lending rate series for households are split into housing and consumer loans. The time series start in January 1994 at the earliest for the CEE-5 and usually end in end-2005. Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of the data and data sources. Furthermore, we distinguished between retail rates on the stock of deposits/loans and those applied to newly collected deposits/newly extended loans. This is important because the (weighted) average interest rates on outstanding deposits and loans (which include contracts with fi xed rates and contracts with variable rates that are adjusted at a later stage) may react more slowly than the interest rates of new deposits and loans. The maturity of the series is another important issue. In conventional interest rate statistics, maturity refers to the duration of the loan or deposit contract, not to the period of interest rate fi xation. In the new harmonized interest statistics developed in the euro area and in new EU Member States, however, maturity refers to the period of interest We constructed another database that includes interest rate series obtained from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS): discount rates (line 60), money market rates (line 60b), T-bill rates (line 60c), deposit rates (line 60l), lending rates (line 60p) and government bond yields (line 61). The series usually cover the period 1991-2005. They are constructed using data series compiled on the basis of different methodologies (which explains their length for transition economies) and do not distinguish between different maturities.
12 Hence, it is interesting to see whether or not the results differ for our two datasets.
Estimation Techniques

Single-Equation Approach
The empirical literature concerned with analyzing the interest rate passthrough usually relies on generalizations of the following error correction model:
(1) where i t R and i t P are the retail (or market) rate and the monetary policy rate, respectively. μ and ε t denote the constant term and the residuals, respectively. β stands for the long-run pass-through, which can be obtained by means of a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate or a Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) estimate as proposed by Stock and Watson (1993) , which accounts for the potential endogeneity of the monetary policy rate by incorporating leads and lags in fi rst differences of the regressor. The DOLS estimate is thus obtained from the regression
where k 1 and k 2 denote leads and lags, respectively. Equation (1) low-, medium-and high-amount deposits: la, ma, ha (e.g. d_1m_la, d_1m_ma, d_1m_ha 
The long-term parameter β in equation (3) can be derived by estimating a standard ARDL model as suggested by Wickens and Breusch (1988) ,
where the long-run elasticity can be obtained as .
The cointegration of the monetary policy rate (i P ) with retail rates (i R ), i.e. whether or not they are linked in the long run, can be assessed by relying either on residual-based cointegration tests (Engle and Granger, 1987) or on the bounds testing approach (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001 ).
According to residual-based cointegration tests, the two variables are cointegrated if the residuals from the long-run relationship
are stationary, where β is obtained as described above (OLS, DOLS and/or ARDL).
The bounds testing approach uses F-tests for the parameters in equation (3): the null given by Η 0 : ρ = β = 0 is tested against the alternative of Η 1 : ρ ≠ β ≠ 0. Two sets of critical values are provided: one for the case when all variables are I(1), i.e. upper-bound critical values, and another one for when all variables are I(0), i.e. lower-bound critical values. If the test statistic is higher than the upper-bound critical value, the null of no cointegration is rejected, whereas an F-statistic lower than the lower-bound critical value does not permit the rejection of the null of no cointegration.
One can hypothesize that a) the speed of adjustment (ρ) to the long-run relationship and b) the short-term dynamics (δ j and φ j ) in equation (3) are different depending on whether the monetary policy rate increases or decreases, which leads to the following specifi cation:
where Ι(•) is an indicator function taking the value 1 if the argument is true and zero otherwise. A simple test for symmetry is then given by the F-test for the following restrictions: ρ 1 = ρ 2 ; δ j = ψ j ; φ j = ζ j for all j. A rejection of the null indicates that there is asymmetry in the speed of adjustment and/or in the
short-term dynamics depending on the direction of the change in the policy rate. We test both separately and jointly for the two types of asymmetries. 
Multivariate Approach
Having established the direct link between the policy rate and diverse market and retail rates with the single-equation approaches described above, we study the chains of this transmission. From this perspective, the interest rate passthrough can be viewed as a chain of pairwise links: policy rate -1m MMR; 1m MMR -12m T-bill/MMR rate;12m T-bill/MMR rate -government bond yield -long-term deposit rate -long-term lending rate (see table 1 ). Using a cointegrated VAR framework (Johansen, 1995) makes it possible to analyze the many pairwise relationships in a single system. Considering vector Υ t to contain a set of interest rates (e.g.
and L referring to monetary policy rate, short-term market rate, long-term market rate, deposit rate and lending rate, respectively), we estimate the following system:
where α and β are n × r matrices, r denotes the cointegration rank of the system and n represents the number of endogenous variables. α stands for the adjustment matrix, β is a matrix that contains the cointegrating vectors and k denotes the lag length. We assume that the cointegration space contains only a constant term (μ 0 ) but no trend.
Full-fl edged transmission from policy to retail rates would imply that there would be 4 cointegration relationships in the presence of 5 interest rate series, so that the cointegrating space is given by: In other words, i P would be connected to i L via the four pairwise longterm cointegration relationships. However, whether or not there is a propor- 
However, in practice, the pass-through may be incomplete in system (8), because the pass-through from the long-term market rate to retail rates may be ineffective, if the yield curve is not stable and/or because the funding of bank lending relies on shorter-term market rates 14 instead of bank deposits/longterm market rates. For instance, if we fi nd 3 cointegrating vectors instead of the 4 required for full pass-through, we estimate a system in which the following cointegrating vectors are assumed (i
. If the relationship between deposit and lending rates is not robust, we assume that both deposit and lending rates are connected to short-term market rates:
Results
Cointegration Results
The fact that all interest rate series turn out to be well-represented by I(1) processes for the periods under review 15 justifi es the use of the cointegration techniques to determine the size of, and the mechanism underlying, the interest rate pass-through.
In a fi rst step, all market and retail interest rate series are regressed on the monetary policy rate for the whole period and for two subperiods. 16 For the CEE-5, the fi rst subperiod ends in 2000:12 and the second subperiod starts in 2001:01, 17 while for Germany and Spain, the dividing line is 1998:12 and 1999:01. 18 The rationale behind splitting the sample into subsamples is to check for major changes in the pass-through over time. Dividing the sample period in 1998-1999 for Germany and Spain kills two birds with one stone: we are able to study not only the time effect, but also the impact of the launch of the euro. (1996-2005 and 1999-2005) We carry out four cointegration tests: two residual-based tests for the OLS/DOLS estimates, 20 one residual-based test and the bounds testing approach for the long-term relationship obtained from with the ARDL model. If at least three of the four test statistics support the presence of cointegration, we will consider that to be robust evidence for cointegration between the policy rate and any given interest rate series.
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The most remarkable feature of the results is the absence of cointegration for a large number of interest rate series. The most striking case is that of Germany, where cointegration could be established only for three series (1-month MMR and two 1-month deposit series). In Spain, the short-term money market rate as well as the rates on aggregate household loans and on housing loans appear to have a stable long-run relationship with the policy rate in all three periods. 22 In addition, the short-and long-term corporate lending rates become cointegrated with the policy rate after 1998, while the relationship for deposit rates breaks down over time. In Austria, the stability of the long-run relationship improves markedly after the introduction of the euro. In the second subperiod, the short-term money market rate, the overnight (household and corporate) deposit rates, the long-term household deposit rates and the long-term consumer lending rates become cointegrated with the policy rate, while only long-term corporate deposit rates are cointegrated during the whole period.
The picture is not much rosier for the CEE-5. The results for 1-month MMR and 12-month MMR/T-bill rates suggest stable cointegration with the policy rate in the Czech Republic and Hungary over the entire period under review, and in Slovakia for the subperiod 2001-2005. While short-term money market rates are linked via a cointegrating vector to the policy rate in Poland in all periods, long-term market rates are linked only in the Czech Republic and perhaps also in Hungary.
Regarding retail rates, the number of cointegrating relationships for retail rates decreases from the fi rst to the second subperiod in Hungary, whereas it increases signifi cantly in Poland and Slovenia. The number of statistically signifi cant long-run relationships is relatively stable over time in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The diffi culty of establishing cointegrating relationships is also supported by estimation results obtained for the IFS dataset.
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Addressing asymmetries in the adjustment to the long-run relationship and in short-run dynamics is only meaningful when cointegration is detected. The results summarized in tables 2a and 2b indicate some common features. First, asymmetry is detected for the 1-month MMR in six out of eight countries in the second subperiod. Second, more asymmetries are observed in the second subperiod. Third, asymmetry is usually present both for the adjustment to the long-run relationship and in short-run dynamics. However, there is no com- mon pattern in the type of retail rates affected by asymmetry. While it only concerns deposit rates in the Czech Republic, Poland and Germany, asymmetry is characteristic of lending rates in Spain and occurs both for deposit and lending rates in Hungary and Slovakia. Slovenia and especially Austria stand out as the most "symmetric" countries in our sample.
Size of the Pass-Through
In the analysis of the size of the interest rate pass-through, we consider the long-run pass-through coeffi cient (β) for cases when cointegration could be established with confi dence. In these cases, the size of the pass-through is obtained using the DOLS and ARDL models presented in equations (2) and (4). Otherwise, we used coeffi cient estimates from a simple OLS run for fi rstdifferenced variables (see tables 2a and 2b). It turns out that, even though the cointegration tests failed to detect long-run relationships between the policy rate and a number of interest rates, the coeffi cient estimates obtained for series taken in fi rst differences provided us with an opportunity to estimate the passthrough coeffi cient after all, as they are very often signifi cant and have the expected positive sign. Let us start with the connection between the policy rate and short-to long-term market rates. It comes as no real surprise that the pass-through from the policy rate to 1-month MMR is not signifi cantly different from 1 for practically all countries and periods. The only exception is Slovakia with an insignifi cant pass-through coeffi cient in the fi rst subperiod turning into a signifi cant coeffi cient of 0.9. In the Czech Republic, the pass-through to 12-month MMR/T-bill rates is nearly complete and in Hungary it is high (albeit declining) with around 85%. A similarly high pass-through emerges for Slovakia for the period 2001-2005. In Poland and Germany, the pass-through drops considerably from about 70% to nearly 40% and 35%, respectively. In Austria and Spain, the size of the pass-through is modest between 30% and 40%.
The pass-through to the long-term market rate (government bonds) drops from high levels in the fi rst subperiod to between 40% and 50% in the second subperiod in the Czech Republic and Hungary and becomes insignifi cant for Poland and the three euro area countries. For transition economies, this is to be expected, since the yield curve at the longer end changed considerably for these economies owing to successful attempts to decrease in infl ation rates.
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With regard to deposit rates, our results demonstrate that the pass-through for overnight (O/N) deposit rates ranges from 10% in Hungary to between 15% and 25% in the Czech Republic, Austria, Germany and Spain, while coming to between 35% and 55% in Poland and Slovakia in the second subperiod. In those countries where sectoral data for O/N deposit rates are available (the Czech Republic, Poland and Austria), a major difference is found only in Poland (higher pass-through for households). These fi gures for the O/N deposit rates are considerably lower than the pass-through coeffi cients of short-to long-term deposit rates in all countries, except for Slovakia and Slovenia, where the pass-through coeffi cients for the latter are not signifi cantly different from zero. The pass-through is typically high for short-term deposits in Germany and for both short-and long-term deposits in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. It is almost complete for corporate deposits in Hungary. In the Czech Republic and in Hungary, the pass-through in this segment of the corporate sector is found to be usually higher than that for households, while the results are mixed for Poland. In addition, and not astonishingly, changes in the policy rate feed into new deposit rates to a larger extent than into the rates on outstanding deposits (Hungary). Deposit rates for large amounts are more responsive to policy rates than those for small amounts (Germany). In Austria and Spain, the pass-through to shortand long-term rates reaches 60% and 40%, respectively, with the coeffi cients being higher for households than for the corporate sector in Austria. Regarding the development of the pass-through to deposit rates over time, the results reveal that it remained fairly stable for most countries, with the notable exceptions of Hungary, Poland and Spain, where the pass-through increased for O/N deposit rates (all three countries), for short-term deposit rates (Spain) and for household rates (Poland). In Austria, the coeffi cients for O/N deposit rates and for long-term household deposit rates became higher over time.
Finally, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at lending rates, which seem to offer us a so far unseen colorful picture. In general, lending rates for households turn out to react less, if at all, to monetary policy rates as compared with lending rates for the corporate sector. No signifi cant or economically meaningful pass-through could be detected for the interest rates on aggregate household lending in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, on consumer lending in Slovakia, on new long-term consumer loans and new housing loans in Hungary, and on housing loans (all maturities) in Germany. Moreover, the pass-through for rates on outstanding housing loans in Hungary and on new housing loans in Austria is only around 20%. The insensitivity of housing loan rates may refl ect the impact of public subsidy schemes in Austria, Germany and Hungary. By contrast, the pass-through for housing loan rates in Slovenia and in Spain is almost complete, although it has declined in Spain.
In Germany, consumer loan rates react little to monetary policy rates (15%). In Austria, the pass-through is small for new short-term consumer loan rates (25%-30%) but complete for new long-term consumer loan rates, while in Slovenia, it amounts to above 70% for consumer loan rates. In Hungary, it comes to almost 60% for new short-term consumer loans and to roughly 40% for the stock of these loans. This is in sharp contrast with the fi nding that the pass-through is zero for new long-term consumer loans in Hungary. Regarding the development of the pass-through to household lending rates over time, the long-run coeffi cients in the second subperiod were partly (Austria, Germany, Hungary) similar to and partly (Poland, Spain) lower than the coeffi cients in the fi rst subperiod and/or the whole period. Only in Slovenia did the size of the coeffi cient increase.
In the CEE-5 and in Spain, corporate loan rates are generally very responsive to monetary policy rate changes, with the pass-through estimate ranging ceec.oenb.at ◊ Focus 1/06 from 50% for Poland to 100% for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia (with the exception of short-term rates) and Spain. In Germany, by contrast, a 1% change in the policy rate generates only a 0.2% to 0.3% change or even no signifi cant reaction in corporate loan rates. Austria is located between the two extremes.
These results should be regarded with some qualifi cation. First, the passthrough for short-term corporate loan rates in Hungary, Austria and Spain seems to be more pronounced than for long-term corporate loan rates. At the same time, no similar pattern emerges for Germany, and the opposite holds true in Slovakia and to some extent also in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia. Second, while pass-through is complete for the rates on new loans, it vanishes completely for the rates on the outstanding stock of loans in Slovakia. Third, the rates on large amount loans exhibit higher pass-through in Austria, similar 1992:11 -2003:6 1992:11 -1998:12 1999:1 -2003 1992:11 -2003:6 1992:11 -1998:6 1999:1 -2003 to the behavior of deposit rates observed in Germany. Finally, no clear-cut statement can be made about the temporal evolution of the pass-through for corporate rates. For instance, the pass-through increased in the second subperiod for long-term lending rates in Spain, while it diminished for the very same rates in Hungary. At the same time, the coeffi cient for short-term lending rates rose in both countries. In Slovakia and Slovenia, the pass-through for long-term rates became signifi cant in the second subperiod. By contrast, the pass-through coeffi cients of corporate lending rates (all maturities) in Poland and Germany were lower in the second period compared with the fi rst and/or the whole period. The estimations for the IFS dataset yield lower pass-through coeffi cients for the lending and deposit rates in most countries. This may be attributable to the fact that the data series are aggregated by sectors and maturity, which may have dampened the effect of monetary policy changes on the retail rates. 1992:11 -2003:6 1992:11 -1998:12 1999:1 -2003 1992:11 -2003:6 1992:11 -1998:12 1999:1 -2003:6 lh_st NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.18*** lh_lt 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.14*** lhc 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.14*** lhh 0.18** 0.22 0.14 lhh_5y 0.18** 0.22 0.14 lhh_10y 0.07 0.02 0.06 1992:11 -2003:6 1992:11 -1998:6 1999:1 -2003 
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The Pass-Through to Retail Rates via Market Rates
For the multivariate VAR approach, we select countries in accordance with a twofold criterion. First, at least 12-month MMR/T-bill rates and retail rates should be connected to the policy rate through a cointegrating vector obtained from the single-equation analysis. Second, both deposit and lending rates of comparable maturity should pass the cointegration criterion with positive and statistically signifi cant coeffi cient estimates. The two countries which qualify in terms of these two criteria are the Czech Republic and Hungary. For the Czech Republic, only the second subperiod is analyzed, given that cointegration for lending rates is found only in the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The selected retail rates are lending rates for the nonfi nancial corporate sector with a maturity of less than 1 year and 1-5 years and an aggregate deposit rate with a maturity of less than 1 year and household deposit rates for maturities longer than overnight. This leads us to build a system for short-term deposit and lending rates (mp→ 1mMMR→ 12mMMR→ dep (d_l1y_s)→ len(lf_l1y)) and for long-term deposit and lending rates (mp→ 1mMMR→ 12mMMR → gbond→ dep(dh_lt_s)→ len(lf_1y5y)). 1992:11 -2003:6 1992:11 -1998:12 1999:1 -2003 1992:11 -2003:6 1992:11 -1998:6 1999:1 -2003 For the short-term system, 26 the trace statistics identify four cointegration vectors. This indicates a full-fl edged pass-through from the monetary policy rate to deposit and lending rates. The long-term coeffi cient, shown in table 3, is close to unity for market rates (1.01 and 1.05). It is 0.73 for the relation 12-month MMR -deposit rate, which is in line with the fi ndings of the single-equation approach if accounting for the previous chains (0.75 versus 1.01*1.05*0.73=0.77). The long-run coeffi cient between deposit and lending rates is as high as 1.16. Therefore, we think that this coeffi cient does not capture the relationship between deposit and lending rates, but rather refl ects the relative size of the pass-through from 12-month MMR rates to those rates. Indeed, if we specify the fourth cointegration vector as linking 12-month MMR rates to the lending rates, the estimated coeffi cient will be 0.85, which is higher than the coeffi cient for the relation 12-month MMR -deposit rate, thus confi rming our earlier results from the direct monetary policy approach (0.86-0.87 versus 1.01*1.05*0.85=0.90).
In the system of long-term rates with six variables, we detected four cointegration relationships. Given that one more variable is included (government bond rates), one chain link is not functional. Our earlier results from the single-equation approach implicitly indicate the absence of cointegration for 26 The lag length in the VAR is selected using the Schwarz information criterion by setting the maximum number of lags to six as in the single-equation approach. the link 12-month MMR -government bond yield. 27 The long-run coeffi cients of this system reported in table 3 confi rm an almost one-to-one reaction of the lending rates to 12-month MMR.
For Hungary, only a fi ve-variable system excluding government bond rates is estimated, since we did not fi nd cointegration between the policy rate and government bond yields. The two systems estimated for consumer loan rates and corporate lending rates provide evidence of a full-fl edged transmission from the policy rate through 1-month MMR and 12-month T-bill rates to deposit rates (new long-term corporate deposit rates) and lending rates (new short-term consumer lending rates and new long-term corporate lending rates). The results furthermore confi rm the fi ndings of the single-equation estimations which show a very strong pass-through to long-term deposit rates and indicate that the pass-through is higher for (long-term) corporate loan rates than for (short-term) consumer loan rates, even though the former becomes weaker, while the latter rises slightly over time.
Comparison with the Literature
Whenever a researcher carries out an empirical analysis, the question arises how the new results compare with those provided in the already existing literature. Table 4 provides an answer to this question by summarizing the fi ndings reported in other studies regarding the size of the long-run passthrough to different retail rates for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Despite some similarities, we discovered several prominent differences between our results and the existing estimates: (1) Our estimates indicate a lower pass-through for overnight and long-term household deposit rates in Hungary and a moderately lower pass-through for all kinds of deposit rates in Poland. (2) Our results show a moderately lower pass-through for longterm corporate loan rates in Hungary and for short-and long-term corporate loan rates in Poland. (3) Our estimations fail to establish any signifi cant relationship between monetary policy rates on the one hand, and deposit rates in Slovakia, as well as aggregate household loan rates (and consumer loan rates) in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, on the other hand.
One key reason for the differences between our results and those obtained by other researchers is that most of them estimate error correction models without having checked the existence of a valid cointegration relationship. However, a number of series are not cointegrated with policy rates. The estimated coeffi cients we derived by using regressions applied to fi rst differenced series tend to be lower than those resulting from the cointegration analysis (which was inappropriate in the given context). Another possible explanation for our lower estimates is a possible decrease in the pass-through over time, given that our data sample covers more recent periods. 
Concluding Remarks
In this study, we analyzed the size of the interest rate pass-through for fi ve CEE countries and three euro area benchmark countries. Our results confi rm earlier fi ndings in the literature that the pass-through is generally very low for overnight deposit rates, but becomes substantially higher for short-to longterm deposit rates. At the same time, corporate lending rates are much more responsive to changes in the policy rate than deposit or household loan rates. Remarkably, the pass-through is almost complete for corporate lending rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Spain. However, given the broad range of results with regard to country-specifi c pass-through estimates, these fi ndings should be generalized only with appropriate caution. Not only corporate loan rates, but also housing loan rates in Slovenia and in Spain and corporate deposit rates in Hungary exhibit (almost) complete pass-through. In Poland and Germany, the pass-through to deposit rates is stronger than that to lending rates. Just to mention a few fi ndings at the other extreme, no signifi cant pass-through could be established for long-term corporate lending rates in Slovakia, for some corporate lending rates in Germany and for new housing loan rates in Hungary. The pass-through to household (and consumer) lending rates in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and to deposit rates in Slovenia appears to be nonexistent.
We found little empirical support for a functioning pass-through to longterm market rates, presumably owing to the instability of the yield curve at the longer end of the curve. Instead, we found evidence that the effect of changes in the key policy rate even transits through money market and T-bill rates to long-term deposit and lending rates. In most cases, it is not possible to use a cointegrated VAR framework to track down the whole mechanism of pass-through because it is diffi cult to detect solid cointegration relationships. Indeed, this framework is capable of describing the interrelated chains of the whole mechanism only for the Czech Republic and Hungary. HKN (2004) , N(2005) , SK(2004) , T(2004) and WP(2002) are Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) , Horváth et al. (2004) , Sander and Kleimeier (2004b) , Tieman (2004) and Wróbel and Pawlowska (2002), respectively. (c) indicates that complete pass-through cannot be rejected.
Focus 1/06 ◊ ceec.oenb.at 109 While other papers identify no major asymmetries for the CEE-5, our results indicate that the reaction of retail and market rates becomes increasingly asymmetric depending on the direction of changes in the policy rate. However, it was not possible to make out a general pattern for this asymmetric behavior for specifi c interest rates (except, perhaps, for short-term money market rates).
More importantly, our pass-through estimates for the CEE-5 tend to be lower for a number of retail rates than those of previous estimates, and we failed to detect signifi cant pass-through effects in a number of cases both for the CEE-5 and the euro area countries. This is, among others, attributable to the fact that previous studies have chiefl y relied on error correction models without explicitly checking the presence of cointegrating relationships between the policy and retail rates. We show that cointegration can be established only for a fraction of the bivariate relationships and that pass-through estimates obtained for fi rst differenced stationary series are lower and sometimes insignifi cant. Furthermore, our lower pass-through estimates could also indicate that pass-through is declining over time, as our data is from a more recent period. This hypothesis is backed by direct evidence.
While the interest rate pass-through is on average higher in the CEE-5 than in Austria and Germany, it tends to decline in the CEE-5, in particular in Hungary and (with respect to lending rates) in Poland. In some cases, however, the evolution of the pass-through over time is not homogeneous even in one country. The substantial slowdown in infl ation rates (and in real GDP growth for a few years in some countries) could be elements of an explanation for the weakening of the pass-through on the macro side. Moreover, our fi nding of a declining pass-through calls into question the general belief that competition among banks has increased in recent years.
At the same time, the interest rate pass-through in the CEE-5 is more comparable with that in Spain than with that in the other euro area countries. This implies that the euro area will probably not become more heterogeneous with respect to the interest rate pass-through in the event that the CEE-5 adopt the euro. In addition, the interest rate pass-through improved slightly in Spain and in Austria, while remaining stable and weak in Germany after the introduction of the euro. This observation casts doubt on the universality of the muchadvocated pass-through-improving effect of the euro owing to an increased integration of, and a higher level of competition on, the euro area fi nancial markets.
